Execution of Louis XVI at the Place de la Révolution, Paris, 21 January 1793. Contemporary engraving.
Europe likes to imagine its revolutions as clean turning points: old world out, new world in.
The French Revolution was nothing of the sort. It was noisy, contradictory, intoxicating—and deeply human. It did not begin with blood, but with paper: with lists of complaints, with hunger, with words that—once printed and repeated—acquired a force of their own.
A pressure cooker ready to burst
By the late 1780s, France was a kingdom running on fumes. Decades of war had hollowed out the treasury: the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), and—most ruinously—financial and military support for the American War of Independence. Victory abroad had produced bankruptcy at home.
The tax system deepened the fracture. Nobles and clergy enjoyed exemptions, while peasants and urban labourers carried the fiscal burden. Bread—always bread—had become scarce and ruinously expensive after poor harvests in 1787–1788. Hunger ceased to be private suffering and became public anger.
Material hardship alone, however, does not make a revolution. What truly destabilised France was expectation. Enlightenment ideas—circulating through salons, pamphlets, Masonic lodges, and provincial academies—had been shaped by thinkers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau. They promoted ideas of rational government, citizenship, legal equality, and popular sovereignty.
When Louis XVI convened the Estates-General in 1789, he meant to resolve a fiscal crisis. Instead, he exposed a crisis of legitimacy. The cahiers de doléances—the lists of grievances drafted across the kingdom—were explosive. People no longer pleaded for mercy; they demanded laws, rights, and accountability. Once expectations begin to rise faster than institutions can adapt, history accelerates.
From reform to rupture
The storming of the Bastille on 14 July 1789 is often remembered as a spontaneous eruption of rage. In reality, it was symbolic theatre with irreversible consequences. The fortress itself mattered less than what it represented: arbitrary royal power, suddenly vulnerable.
What followed was not a straight line but a widening spiral. Feudal privileges were abolished. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen proclaimed universal principles of liberty and equality. The king was recast as a constitutional monarch—then, slowly and fatally, redefined as an enemy of the nation.
By 1792–1793, France was at war with Europe—and with itself. Externally, revolutionary France faced the War of the First Coalition, fighting Austria, Prussia, Britain, Spain, and others who feared the spread of revolutionary contagion. Internally, counter-revolutionary uprisings and royalist conspiracies multiplied.
Fear hardened into policy. Suspicion became civic virtue. The revolution radicalised because it felt surrounded, betrayed, and unfinished. This was the moment when newspapers ceased merely to describe events and began to mobilise readers, compressing time, moral nuance, and restraint into urgent calls for action.
Ink, anger, and the street
Revolutionary Paris was flooded with print: pamphlets, posters, journals—cheap, fast, emotional. None more influential than L’Ami du peuple, written by Jean-Paul Marat.
A notorious example appeared in early September 1792, when Marat warned that imprisoned “enemies of the people” would soon rise against the Revolution. He named generals, ministers, and aristocrats, arguing that pre-emptive violence was an act of public salvation. Within days, the September Massacres followed. Whether Marat caused them or legitimised them remains debated—but his words undeniably shaped the moral climate.
Marat did not inform his readers; he warned them. He named enemies. He framed violence as prevention. His writing remains uncomfortable because it is effective: short sentences, absolute moral divisions, no space for doubt. The world is split between the people and their enemies, and hesitation itself becomes betrayal.
Alongside him, Le Père Duchesne spoke in the voice of the street—coarse, furious, deliberately vulgar. It sounded like Paris shouting back at power.
By contrast, Révolutions de Paris attempted to narrate events rather than inflame them. Its reports of the journées of August 1792, for example, describe crowds, rumours, and violence with a degree of narrative distance—an excellent source if you want a contemporaneous account that still resembles storytelling.
Words mattered because they collapsed the distance between thought and action.
Terror as a system
The execution of Louis XVI in January 1793 shattered the final restraints.
Regicide changed the nature of the Republic overnight. It was now absolute—or doomed.
The Terror did not erupt spontaneously; it was organised. Revolutionary tribunals, surveillance committees, denunciation lists. The guillotine was not a mob weapon but an administrative one. What makes this period so unsettling is not merely its brutality, but its logic. Violence was redefined as moral hygiene. Death became a tool of clarity.
Even so, the revolution devoured its own prophets: the men who had given it its language, its moral certainty, and its sense of inevitability. Jean-Paul Marat, whose writings in L’Ami du peuple taught Parisians to see violence as civic necessity, was murdered in 1793. Jacques Hébert, the voice of radical popular anger and editor of Le Père Duchesne, was sent to the guillotine in 1794. Maximilien Robespierre—a lawyer, architect of the Terror, and believer that virtue and terror were inseparable instruments of republican purity—followed them to the scaffold soon after.
The revolution could not stop proving its own purity.
After the fire
By 1795, France was exhausted. Power passed to the Directory, a five-man executive body meant to stabilise the Republic and prevent both royalist restoration and popular dictatorship. It promised order and delivered corruption, political paralysis, and reliance on military force.
Stability returned only with a general who understood both revolution and discipline: Napoleon Bonaparte.
Napoleon closed the revolutionary chapter while exporting its consequences. By “exporting,” contemporaries meant conquest—but also institutions. Legal equality before the law, secular administration, rationalised taxation, and codified civil rights travelled across Europe with French armies. The revolution failed to remain democratic, but it succeeded in making the old order impossible to restore unchanged.
France never fully recovered from 1789. It learned to live with a dangerous idea: that legitimacy flows upward from the people—and that crowds, once awakened, do not easily fall silent again.
